Here is a video I made with highlights from the Faith Summer Session 2007 at Woldingham. It is slightly edited from the version shown at Woldingham and reduced in size for uploading to YouTube and Facebook.
Our Lady of the Rosary, Blackfen
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49 comments:
If anyone shall have said that it is possible that to the dogmas declared by the Church a meaning must sometimes be attributed according to the progress of science, different from that which the Church has understood and understands: let him be anathema
Very nice - seems like it was a great conference!
I've attempted to contact the Faith website using their 'Contact' thingey, but I got a message saying that access was denied and mentioning something about not being able to read the cgi script. Their 'Products' page has been saying for ages that the talks would be available on CD, but they have never advertised them. Is the page out of date, or have the CDs not yet been cut? Not sure if you can help on this, but you might like to tell them that their Contacts facility doesn't work. Thanks.
was i mistaken? i thought the sisters wore veils?
Vatican I - nobody in Faith says that.
Anon - the "Ask a question" and the email address on the "Contact us" tab were working just now.
I have reported your concern to the webmaster in case something is going wrong on the site.
Fr Tim, perhaps you might write a post elaborating a bit on the relationship between science and theology, in the light of that Vatican I definition. As far as I know, part of the Faith charism is the redefinition of the truths of the faith in the light of modern science (for example, supplanting the traditional, 'static' language of 'substance' and 'accident'). To what extent might this involve attributing 'different' meaning to the dogmas of the Church?
I agree with Jackie Parkes. What sort of Nuns are these? I had a look at their website and I am none the wiser
Hi Felix as far as i know Faith doesnt seek to do away with 'substance' and 'accident'. Also in terms of its 'reliance' on science esp in light of the above quote - Faith seeks to explain the Catholic faith as it has ALWAYS been in a terminology and synthesis more accesible to people formed in modern scientific culture. I would add that revelation has always been goven primacy in presentations by the movement in my experience. Finally to say that Faith claims to 'redefine' truths of the faith is way off the mark!
What I meant by 'redefine' is exactly what you say they do: 'explain the Catholic faith as it has ALWAYS been in a terminology and synthesis more accesible to people formed in modern scientific culture'. Poor choice of words on my part! I wasn't suggesting that they seek to change radically the content of the Faith. But even this new synthesis, or new articulation of the faith, must claim to contain new insights, surely? I just wonder how this fits with the VI definition... (I'm having a little trouble digesting it myself, tbh...)
As for the substance, accident thing, I had thought that part of the new synthesis was a relational metaphysics, based on the insights of science, over against the static metaphysics of the Greeks...
Once the integrity of the faith has been safeguarded, then it is time to guard the proper way of expressing it, lest our careless use of words give rise, God forbid, to false opinions regarding faith in the most sublime things. St. Augustine gives a stern warning about this when he takes up the matter of the different ways of speaking that are employed by the philosophers on the one hand and that ought to be used by Christians on the other. "The philosophers," he says, "use words freely, and they have no fear of offending religious listeners in dealing with subjects that are difficult to understand. But we have to speak in accordance with a fixed rule, so that a lack of restraint in speech on our part may not give rise to some irreverent opinion about the things represented by the words.'' And so the rule of language which the Church has established through the long labor of centuries, with the help of the Holy Spirit, and which she has confirmed with the authority of the Councils, and which has more than once been the watchword and banner of orthodox faith, is to be religiously preserved, and no one may presume to change it at his own pleasure or under the pretext of new knowledge. Who would ever tolerate that the dogmatic formulas used by the ecumenical councils for the mysteries of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation be judged as no longer appropriate for men of our times, and let others be rashly substituted for them? In the same way, it cannot be tolerated that any individual should on his own authority take something away from the formulas which were used by the Council of Trent to propose the Eucharistic Mystery for our belief. These formulas—like the others that the Church used to propose the dogmas of faith—express concepts that are not tied to a certain specific form of human culture, or to a certain level of scientific progress, or to one or another theological school. Instead they set forth what the human mind grasps of reality through necessary and universal experience and what it expresses in apt and exact words, whether it be in ordinary or more refined language. For this reason, these formulas are adapted to all men of all times and all places.
Mr Randal and PVI;
I can see what You are saying, and I can see that there is a very fine line between re-articulating the faith and re-defining the content of it. Indeed by changing words and the context of them we can almost appear to 'change' the nature of the objective subject that we are describing...care does have to be taken.
I can see what you are saying on the a&S thing also, you may be correct. But as far as I understand it the aim is not to do away with the realtionship between a&s altogether but to get away from an overly dualistic approach that has allowed philosophies such as materialism through the back door. I think.
I would like to ask PVI if there is ever an occasion in which a theologian may try to describe elements of the faith in a new way? Was TA himself revolutionary in method and terminology? I ask because I am unsure myself.
Finally I would say the Faith charism is priarily in using terminology that is aimed at and esp useful in seeing all of traditional theology as a whole and making simple and organic connections between concepts such as creation ex nihilo and the incarnation or original sin....
I don't think the distinction between substance and accident admits of degrees. Imprecision of language is notoriously vulnerable to materially heretical misunderstanding and the introduction of novelties below the radar. Given that Vatican II and the Code of Canon Law describe ‘the principles of St Thomas’ as ‘that philosophy which remains forever valid’ it seems a bit odd to import a whole new vocabulary from a private system of one's own invention erected on the basis of private revelations which the Church has never investigated or approved. In regard to your penultimate point, PVI does say that the rule of language established by the Church is ‘adapted to all men of all times and all places.’ The fact that it has been established over time, with notable progress being made in the thirteenth century, does not justify its abrogation and replacement with a new vocabulary supposedly more fitted to the age (and so presumably soon to be unsuited to succeeding ages). Paul VI seems to be excluding precisely this.
Theodosius - there is no question of "abrogating" St Thomas or replacing his terminology. Paul VI insisted on the terminology of transubstantiation. Faith has always insisted on that too.
Many quite orthodox 20th century theologians discussed how transubstantiation could be understood given what we now know of the structure of matter. I am sure that St Thomas would have engaged on the same sort of project - probably with greater clarity and success.
Fr, what matter are you talking about?
The Church does not advise us to follow the principles we imagine St Thomas might have adopted had he concerned himself with the claims of 20th century empirical science, it advises us to follow the principles of St Thomas. The ideas concerning the “structure of matter” currently popular among empirical scientists are utterly irrelevant to the doctrine of transubstantiation and belong to an altogether different order of knowledge from that of the aforementioned “principles of St Thomas”. If in twenty years’ time empirical scientists decide that things are not made of atoms or quarks but wibbles and bobbles the adherents of St Thomas’s principles will remain serenely unconcerned and continue to mean by matter, form, substance, accident, potency, act, essence, existence, nature and person what they have always meant, and will remained unconcerned when the wibble and the bobble, the theory of evolution and superstrings have gone the way of the steady state universe, Newton’s ether and Ptolemy’s epicycles. Those unfortunate persons however who have invested their hopes and fears in the movement which offered to synthesize the Church’s teachings with the new world of the wibble and the bobble will suffer great perplexity and distress and no small spiritual harm. This is a consideration which should be born in mind by persons determined to yoke the faith of their brethren to the intrinsically provisional offerings of empirical science rather than to equip it with that philosophy which remains for ever valid, the metaphysics of St Thomas who as John Paul II observed created “not merely a philosophy of ‘what seems to be’ but a philosophy of ‘what is’”.
an altogether different order of knowledge
Trouble with that is that you end up, like so many neo-Thomists, in a Kantian universe where we can never really know the real. This is one of the problems about which Thomists have not remained serenely unconcerned.
I cannot subscribe to your radical skepticism about the human ability to know the real world and I don't think St Thomas would.
Father, it is not a matter of skepticism extreme or otherwise still less anything to do with the unfortunate Kant. We should not be skeptical about our senses or our ordinary ability to know the world around us. This is very different from our speculative reconstructions of realities distant from us in time or vast cosmic spaces or too small to be detected with certainty or without instruments which interfere with the reality observed. Different but quite legitimate methods of investigation admit of and aspire to different levels of certainty. The principles of St Thomas (not Thomism in any indiscriminate sense), which are described by the Church, and not just by me, as the perennial philosophy, are founded upon realities immediately available to us such as change and motion, substantial unity, degrees of perfection and corruption etc. The progress of technology or exploration does not affect such things, their existence is not in doubt we can with certainty establish conclusions on the basis of these realities. This makes the perennial philosophy a fit tool for the exposition of the Church’s teaching an appropriate handmaid of theology. Other disciplines like history or the experimental natural sciences admit of a different level of certainty which is quite sufficient for the uses to which they are put, but which very properly requires that the models of the past or the universe or the microscopic world which they propose be open to constant revision and periodic overthrow. This is no criticism of these disciplines it is part of their method and the secret of the successes which they can achieve but it makes them unsuited to synthesis with theology. To attempt such a synthesis inevitably results in theological error often theosophical, pantheist or millenarian. The Church has proposed the principles of St Thomas which pass beyond what ‘seems to be’ to ‘what is’ (John Paul II’s words not mind) as a safeguard against such rash adulteration of her creed and the stability of its content. To dispense with this safeguard is to mislead the faithful and risk serious scandal when the shortcoming of this method are exposed.
Oh but it is an extreme skepticism. You are confident that we can observe change and motion and establish conclusions with certainty without the experimental sciences. However, once the experimental sciences have demonstrated that light and heavy objects fall with exactly the same acceleration due to gravity, that light is refracted through a prism, that the earth moves round the sun, that (shock horror) organisms evolve through natural selection...
Then you have to have two orders of knowledge of reality - a distinction unknown to St Thomas and only necessary for you to make because of the development of the natural sciences.
This is the reason for the discussions undertaken by the neo-Thomists. And unfortunately, if you reject all certainty from the natural sciences, you do end up in a position very close to that of Kant.
This is the problem. all those discussions of Thomist philosophy n the 20th century did not just grow out of "modernism". There was, and is, a real question to be answered.
Faith is trying to make a contribution to this - not rejecting the philosophia perennis but attempting to uphold it.
Among Theodosius' interesting points he says: "... our ordinary ability to know the world around us ... is very different from our speculative reconstructions of realities distant from us in time or vast cosmic spaces" which latter are "unsuited to synthesis with theology".
This makes scientific (and historical) methodology radically different from normal human observation. As Fr Tim implies (much more succinctly than I am able) this seems, I think, close to an epistemological dualism. It risks patronizing the scientist and the modern man who uses technological creations as part of his every day life.
Both every day knowing and experimental methodology capture patterns across space and time from the past which help us engage meaningfully with our world in the present/future.
John Paul II's "seems to be" in Fides et Ratio 44 refers, I would think, to the inherent subjectivity of human knowing, not an inherent, radical provisonality in (an aspect of) our knowing. This latter Popperian concept is not in JPII's epistemology, let alone that of St Thomas - which would be an anachronism indeed.
JPII goes on five para.s later to say that "The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others" (referring to Humanae Generis). In n.56 he states "it is necessary not to abandon … the audacity to forge new paths … willingly to run risks" (56).
Good philosophies will never be complete or infallible, and always have fuzzy edges, which need, at the opportune time, development. Thomas, like Aristotle, moved from physics to metaphysics. He would do the same in the age of a new physics/chemistry/biology - which does develop our understanding of "change and motion, substantial unity ..." and their interelationship, as we should expect it to.
The Angelic Doctor is a saint and was a genius. His principles concerning realism, the concept of the nature of things, holism, the avoidance of pantheism, among others (cf. F&R 80), are perennial. Their undermining in the Age of Science has been tragic for Christianity and so for Man. But their undermining has happened for intellectual reasons, however false. As Per John Paul's exhortation we "urgently" (n. 83) need to find ways of intelligibly reaserting these bulwarks for the scientific age.
Fr Finigan, I would really like to know what matter you meantin your comment about the structure of matter, it was a real question!
Also scuse me for butting in and not having a scoob really but is the problem that substantial unity change and motion really aren't what Thomas and co. thought they were,or is it that what people thought were examples of substantial unity change and motion aren't? Like species of things. You think an example would be horses, or, um, cabbage whites - but then if things evolve out of other things that would seem not possible, and it would have to be (I think) that the difference between horse and miohippus or between the cabbage white and the red admiral aren't specifying differences or whatever one would call them but merely accidental ones. Which doesn't touch the existence of natures or species, just what examples of them are. I think. No?
Sorry, Berenike - just looked up the comment you were referring to. The word "matter" in the phrase "structure of matter" refers to the created material universe: matter as opposed to spirit, not "prime matter" or matter as opposed to form.
"The word "matter" in the phrase "structure of matter" refers to the created material universe: matter as opposed to spirit, not "prime matter" or matter as opposed to form. "
q1)In which case, what possible difference can it make to the understanding of the doctrine of transubstantiation, in which, I always thought, the structure of the matter-as-opposed-to-spirit has nothing to do with the change?
St Thomas does indeed make the distinction in question in several places including the Summa Theologiae. It does indeed concern different orders of knowledge (of which there are many) it does not concern different orders of reality. I have made no comment at all on the truth or falsity of the theory(s) of evolution which is not at issue. Nor have I encountered any panic-stricken Catholics who have said to me “how can we still adhere to the major theses of St Thomas in the light of the writings of Fr Holloway and his mother’s private revelations?!”
What is important here is that experimental science is and must be subject to revision and periodic overthrow of its very nature and is consequently unfit for synthesis with Sacred Theology. Whether or not this is a ‘patronizing’ attitude is extremely unimportant. Failure to accept this clear fact of intellectual history simply manifests a superstitious awe for the empirical sciences and their practitioners which does no one any good but is sadly characteristic of the age. Presumably you do not believe in ether, epicycles or the steady state theory? This is the problem you see, however well established now any such theory may be, assent to it while reasonable in itself remains a matter of belief. The element of human prudence involved in the method of these sciences, while perfectly legitimate in its own sphere, introduces a human authority into the presentation of the Church’s teaching in a way which threatens the authenticity of the faith, because the Church has no authority to determine the truth or falsity of theses in the natural sciences.
The central issue is very straightforward and it has a lot to do with Modernism.
1.Vatican I condemned those who alter the sense of the Church’s teachings as a result of the progress of science.
2.Pius X taught that the meaning of the Church’s teaching cannot be preserved unless one adheres to the ‘major theses’ or ‘principles’ of St Thomas.
3.Pius X issued a decree enumerating twenty four of these major theses.
Therefore, if the ‘Faith Movement’ does not seek to alter the meaning of the Church’s teaching it should be able to subscribe without qualification to these theses. This would not establish that its ideas do not in fact diverge from the meaning of the doctrines proposed by the magisterium or clear them abandoning the approved formulae which Paul VI teaches are suitable for all men and all times, but it would at least indicate that the organization intends to remain faithful to the content of the Church’s teaching.
Can and will the ‘Faith Movement’ subscribe without qualification to the 24 Theses of St Pius X?
If not it and its adherents are and must remain in the words of Pius X and Leo XIII ‘exposed to very grave danger’ and ‘always to be suspected’.
Theodosius,
I am surprised at the vehemence with which you attack the work of the Faith movement. Reading your comments, I can only conclude that you have either not read, or mis -read, most of what the movement produces.
‘What is important here is that experimental science is and must be subject to revision and periodic overthrow of its very nature and is consequently unfit for synthesis with Sacred Theology.’
I would like to know what exactly about the movement gives you this impression? The movement has never been in ‘superstitious awe’ of the sciences and certainly does not try to synthesize any particular theory with sacred theology. Sometimes a theory such as evolution is used for demonstrative purposes - but never forms the foundation of the theology given. In fact it would be irresponsable for the Church to not show how its timeless truths are not in contradiction with current theories; this is necessary evangelisation as called for by JPII and similarly given in some of Cardinal Schonborn’s works. In fact many in the church over that last 15 yrs including our last two popes along with the Faith movement have demonstrated how scientific theory makes more sense and finds its fulfilment when viewed in the light of the teaching of the church which always hold primacy.
‘because the Church has no authority to determine the truth or falsity of theses in the natural sciences.’
The Faith movement does not disagree with you here!
‘Therefore, if the ‘Faith Movement’ does not seek to alter the meaning of the Church’s teaching.’
The movement quite categorically does not wish to alter the meaning of Church teaching! Again, where does this impression come from?
If not it and its adherents are and must remain in the words of Pius X and Leo XIII ‘exposed to very grave danger’ and ‘always to be suspected’. Nor have I encountered any panic-stricken Catholics who have said to me “how can we still adhere to the major theses of St Thomas in the light of the writings of Fr Holloway and his mother’s private revelations?!”
Well all I would say to the above is that the philosophical concerns for the coherence of the faith through the eyes of modern ‘scientific man’ with whom the Church has a duty to be in constant dialogue were expressed in the 1940's by Edward Holloway and his mother. They foresaw the devastating effects of a philosophy of science that was purely material and lacking the divine; it is the main reason along with opulence, as to why our numbers in the west have been decimated. So while you don’t meet many ‘panic stricken’ Catholics on the issues Holloway deals with, the Church certainly is desperately trying to answer the intellectual challenges of the modern age, in fact the catechism shows glimpses of a response and indeed mirrors much of what Holloway wrote many years previous. However the reality is that for the average Catholic in our country today, there are being no answers given to the scientific hegemony at an intellectual level graspable by most. At least Faith is actually trying to do something about this. And may I add its doing it very well. I know so many young people who have been brought to a full and traditional understanding of the faith as it has always been taught through the movement. A good way to judge movements within the Church are in their fruits, the Faith movement has an extraordinary record of encouraging vocations to married life, religious and esp the priesthood, indeed 18 seminarians attended the last conference.
Theodosius may I ask finally, how far does our understanding of the material world produce the philosophies we use? Indeed what sort of a philosophy does not have relation to the material as we comprehend it? Did Thomas create his philosophy ex nihilo, without reference to the material and immediate? Will the understanding by the Church of eternal truths ever improve? Did not Thomas attempt exactly that?
Dear Anonymous,
About your Fruits point. Eggzackly. It does great stuff. Theodosius may not have met many Catholics worried about how to subscribe to "principles of St Thomas in the light of the writings of Fr Holloway". I have met many Catholics who - like me - think the Faith movement is absolutely marvellous in every way. With the exception of this fascination with the writings of Fr Holloway. Some are uninterested in general, most - like me - are completely baffled as to why people think it's exciting. And further think that it appears to cause more confusion than clarity.
If the Faith movement didn't do great things then no-one would give this matter a second thought! But it is, as said above, Absolutely Marvellous, at least in my humble opinion. Except for the thing being discussed, to some extent, in this comments box. And again, precisely because it does such Great Stuff it's worth talking about reservations people have. It seems sensible to raise them with those who promote the ideas of the Faith movement, who presumably think it worth explaining why these ideas are so important or why they are not wrong. Me, I'm still trying to work out the former, hence my comments/questions above.
Hey Berenike,
I can understand completely why some people may at first see the movement as being overly obsessed with the writings of Fr Holloway. Indeed I can see how some would see that the 'revelations' to Mrs Holloway appear to be a bit odd and dubious. However, the fact that either may appear a bit odd does not render Fr Holloway's writings faulty, nor Mrs Holloway’s 'revelations' false. The Church ultimately will decide if such over a period of time.
In the meantime the faithful should look at the writings 'in themselves' and make individual informed opinions on them. It is the nature of revelation that it will always be regarded as suspicious at first - there are many historical examples of that in the Church. Similarly, with those wishing to add to our theological understanding of the faith - any writer appearing to be a bit different will be regarded with suspicion. At the beginning Fr Holloway was for many years branded as a dangerous liberal for accepting the possibility of evolution etc, while towards the end of his priesthood was regarded somewhat as a neo con for his moral standpoints in defense of the Church's moral teaching! Only time will judge his work effectively. Also to note in the meantime is that all such writings are completely compatible with the teaching of the Church.
What is interesting about Edward and Agnes Holloway was the context of their ideas. Agnes a pious yet theologically unformed housewife received very simple revelations about the question in theology ‘how much is mind, how much is matter?’ The answers to the questions she posed often through the promptings of her son Edward who was training for the priesthood formed the basis for his theological writing later. What is interesting is that the problem of the conceptual gap between the traditional Thomistic epistemology and our modern scientific one was predicted before the latter became so dominant, before it was a visible problem - Agnes was warned in the 1940's about this and was told it would devastate the Church if not addressed. Vatican II was starting to try to address this problem, among others, twenty years later as scientific methodology became dominant.
The writings of JPII often call for Catholics to respond to the vocation of philosophy in search of a new synthesis. What Holloway was doing far before, was saying - hang on, there need not be such a false dichotomy between the philosophical underpinnings of science and theology. It was not a case of bowing down to science - but rather claiming back what had always been the Church’s possession. That the very philosophy that allows science to be at all must be reliant on the person of Christ ‘the master key to the meaning of the universe’. So the ‘excitement’ Berenike, is in the fact that Holloway was claiming atheistic mans’ greatest tool, his scientific epistemology, and showing how incomplete it is and devoid of meaning without its proper context - that of Logos and Savior. This is the heart of his ‘synthesis’. Showing how the truths of theology are not falsified by our current scientific understanding and how such understanding is incomplete without its foundation in God. So synthesis can sometimes mislead in that it suggests that Holloway was making science an equal partner - no, he was reclaiming science for the faithful of his age; synthesis in so far as there need not be any real dichotomy. What makes his philosophical approach even more ‘exciting’ is that it often links the moral teaching of the church with the above in a way that allows young people especially to see the Church’s teaching as organic, natural and positive rather than arbitrary and rigid.
However Holloway’s writing style is awkward and he wrote a lot! Thus a large part of the work of the work of the movement now is editing and developing his thought.
Esp relevant to the above debate and an example of the development of Hollways thought is the editorial by Fr Hugh on matter in Sept/Oct 2006 at: http://www.faith.org.uk/Publications/MagOldIssues.htm
And the story of Agnes Holloway and the context of the ideas: God's Master Key: The Law of Control and Direction Agnes Holloway £5 at: http://www.faith.org.uk/Shop/Books.htm
My last comment I promise!!!! :)
I have seen chronological charts displayed at Faith Conferences mixing up salvation history with a speculative reconstruction of the evolution of man based on contemporary theories in the natural sciences, quite clearly placing these two on the same level. You never hear it admitted at such events that the body of Eve was created out of the body of Adam, though this is clearly taught in Leo XIII’s encyclical Arcanum (and elsewhere). I have repeatedly heard it stated that God created the body of the first man merely through the infusion of an immortal soul into pre-existing organic matter that was already biologically human. This opinion is obviously incompatible with the Church’s teaching that the intellectual soul is the form of the human body. That God created the first man out of pre-existing organic matter is a tolerated theological opinion but the claims made at ‘Faith Conferences’ go far beyond this. The assertions of Fr Holloway about the angelic nature of the soul are often bandied about at these events whether attributed to him or not. These are also incompatible with the dogma of the unicity of the soul. I have also often heard it stated that while the mediaevals held to a doctrine of substance and accident we ‘now realise that a thing is identical with the sum of its attributes’ a claim which is a de facto rejection of the doctrine of transubstantiation and can only end in consubstantiation or some bizarre claim that Our Lord is hypostatically united to the species of bread and wine at the consecration. In fact it was the latter position I was offered when I inquired about the matter with one of the speakers (a ‘Faith’ Priest) after the talk. Both these positions are heretical.
These specific divergences from Catholic doctrine appearing in the talks at these events are, I am sure, unintentional but they arise from the whole concept of synthesising the faith with the empirical sciences. In fact, some of these errors do not even arise from the attempt at synthesis with the natural sciences per se but from the adoption of Cartesian or Post-Cartesian positions on ‘matter’ which term is (as Berenike’s point implies) not used in the sense employed by St Thomas or St Augustine. Father’s clarification here is not entirely helpful as St Thomas and Pius X mean by spirit precisely subsistent form. These Cartesian/Post Cartesian ideas do not in fact arise from post-Newtonian natural science which is perfectly compatible with the traditional hylomorphism proposed by Pius X and taught by St Thomas. The idea of matter-as-extension and substances-identical-with-their-attributes were confused by Descartes and his successors with the pioneering scientific developments at the time but there is no necessary connection. These are erroneous philosophical claims which are indeed incompatible with the Church’s teaching but which we need not adopt in order to subscribe to Newtonian or Modern Physics still less the theory of evolution. In answer to Anon, It is true that some basic experiments (like that mentioned earlier with the prism) do involved the immediate perception of existing things with our senses but this does not extend to our extrapolation of explanations for the behaviour of light which is much more speculative and must be open to revision (manifesting the fact that this kind of reasoning is not fit for synthesis with theology). Indeed, we have two working theories of light going at the same time at the moment! This is all very different to fundamental assertions like, ‘things exist’, ‘things cease to exist’, ‘things change without ceasing to exist’, ‘what things are and that things are is distinct’, and then working out what must be true about the fundamental structure of being and reality on account of these incontrovertible facts about the world. These are not observations about which we could be wrong and they do not need to be verified by experimentation. There is consequently no danger that they will be tested to destruction or that we will accidentally build our answers into our questions. Through refection upon such fundamental truths of being we can come to certain demonstrable conclusions about reality. The Church has authority to judge and condemn or define in these matters which touch upon the metaphysics of creation, the incarnation and the sacraments. These are the core principles of St Thomas which remain ‘forever valid’ and which the ‘Faith Movement’ neglects at its and its followers’ peril.
Theodosius - if a "Faith Priest" said that the body of Christ is hypostatically united to the appearances of bread and wine, they were wrong.
The chronological chart does not place salvation history and the history of evolution "on the same level". In fact, it was developed from a previous chart which limited itself to human history. The point of it is to show that if a modern scientific understanding is true, and the universe is billions of years old, we must still assert that it was created in the beginning by God and will end in the parousia. In fact, the chart is colour-coded to distinguish between the work of God in salvation history and the work of God in creation.
It is possible to be wrong about metaphysics. The Church's acceptance of different schools in Christian philosophy bears witness to this (they cannot all be right.)
And it is possible to use our scientific knowledge to inform our discussion of metaphysics. St Thomas did that and so must we.
You have raised a number of important questions worthy of more extensive discussion and I intend to take up some of these in various posts in due course.
Perhaps more important than the booklets mentioned by anon are the pamphlets "Perspectives in Philosophy". I hope that these would be helpful in giving you a more stable account of the philosophical speculation within Faith. For many people, they would be a bit technical but I am sure you would find them of interest - if only to have something solid to argue back against.
All the best. Fr Tim.
Theodosius says: “What is important here is that experimental science is and must be subject to revision and periodic overthrow of its very nature and is consequently unfit for synthesis with Sacred Theology.”
1. I personally would not accept this philosophy of science. It affirms that beliefs about the material realm, in order to be ‘knowledge’, immune from the need for deeper contextualization. We would agree that experimental ´theories´ cannot match such criteria, but would deny that the criteria have any applicability concerning human knowledge of the actual reality of material things, whatever method of observation is employed – i.e. experimental or otherwise. At the same time we affirm that humans do have partial, knowledge of matter-energy as it really is, under the Mind of God.
I (and I think Fr Holloway), would say that the dichotomy concerning knowledge of the physical reality in the cosmos, which Theodosius is certainly not alone in holding, between abstract, static conceptual ‘knowledge’ and changing, developing, useful but inherently “overthrowable” ‘beliefs’ is a distinction between two non-existent ways of human perception. It is a distinction which responds to science but which has failed to stand up to the reality of a society which has taken into its normal daily living and culture the results of the scientific endeavour. It has been, we believe, a cause of much confusion within modern Catholicism.
We need a philosophy of science that, one might say, plots a course somewhere between the two extremes. It would also describe the nature of human observation of whatever type. Holloway´s philosophy offer a way forward in seeing the patterns of the past which we observe as part of a unity with the future, which we only gradually observe. This would need more discussion and we don’t claim that it is all worked out by any means.
2. However the suggestion that these attempts to bring a deeper coherence to our presentation of the faith, in the light of developing human observation and reflection upon it, can be separated from the wider work (and fruits) of FAITH movement is far-fetched. They make up our historical and intellectual roots are our raison d’etre.
3. As for the charging of FAITH movement with heterodoxy, concerning the “24 theses”:
I am not sure about adhering “without qualification” to each of the twenty-four theses.This may well be one of the many areas that thinkers associated with Fr Holloway´s ideas should look into.
I would certainly dispute that Pius X’s wise attempt to prevent the slide into relativism that would and, later, did result from the dismantling of the grand and so fruitful Thomistic synthesis means placing all the metaphysical details of the 24 theses on a par with traditional, repeated and defined teachings of the Church. They do not appear in the catechism. The catechism does move towards recognizing the inter-relative unity of all material creation. They are not referred to in John Paul II´s Fides et Ratio, which does outline some perennial principles in n.83 and other places. I do not think exclusive concern with the theses is in line with John Paul II´s passionate plea for development, in tune with the heart of Thomas’s project.
'18 seminarians attended the last conference'
That is very impressive, could this be a Faith Movement takeover? Just imagine how many young people could be brought to the Faith Movement by 18 newly ordained 'Faith' Priests.
The Church has only once, in the decree Postquam Sanctissimus, clarified explicitly what it means by the ‘Principles of St Thomas’ which it has so often commended to the faithful as ‘forever valid’ and as an indispensable means of understanding her dogmas. Only principles which are ‘forever valid’ may safely and fittingly be synthesised with the articles of faith. The inherent and deliberate fallibility of the empirical method means that just as the mediaevals were quite correct (given the information available to them) to postulate the nine celestial spheres even though as it happens they do not exist; so many of the things the natural scientists of our day suppose to exist will one day be shown not to exist. Entirely legitimate within their own sphere, many of the conclusions of the empirical sciences will nevertheless always remain the “wisdom of this age... doomed to pass away” (1 Cor 2:6). It can be salutary to show that this or that theory in the natural sciences is not incompatible with the truths of the faith, but to dwell too much on such a point is to mislead the faithful, because it is theoretically possible that the empirical sciences could follow their method quite correctly and yet come to false conclusions that do genuinely contradict the truths of the faith. To give impressionable young people the idea that this cannot occur is a hostage to fortune and an injury to their faith. For a movement to go further even than this and to adapt their presentation of the truths of the faith to the framework of contemporary theory in the natural sciences is to ensure that the faith of those who adhere to this movement will one day be shackled to a corpse. If, as it seems to me, the movement in question goes further still and syllogizes theologically mingling premises from the natural sciences and from revelation, the danger arises that the theological virtue of faith itself will be jeopardised because the product of these syllogisms will rest not upon the authority of God but upon the prudential judgement of natural scientists. I would advise anyone to eschew such a movement ‘that your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the power of God.’ (1 Cor 2:5)
The medievals spoke often about the natural world in the context of their theology. Some of their observations about the natural world were wrong. It is sensible to do the same as they did with what we know now.
I still think that you are overly skeptical about our knowledge of the natural world. Science is an essentially Christian enterprise which assumes that the world is ordered and capable of investigation and explanation, and assumes that the human mind can know the truth about the world. In some cases there are radical mistakes but most of the time it is a question of improving our understanding, not of a complete re-think.
Theodosius says: the experimental “kind of reasoning …. is all very different to fundamental assertions like ‘things exists’, ‘things cease to exist’ …. These are not observations about which we could be wrong and they do not need to be verified by experiment ….” (Aug 16th)
And “it is theoretically possible that the empirical sciences could follow their method quite correctly and yet come to false conclusions” (Aug 18th)
1. This is a helpful and succinct articulation of a certain and popular philosophy of science. It’s good to be able to discuss it. I think it has been a real problem in Catholic thinking since the rise of the ‘New Science’. I believe it is more influenced by Popper than the Catholic tradition.
2. The distinction made above between virtual infallibility and radical fallibility is I think false and red-herring. In short I'd say that concerning any and all knowledge of the cosmos the possibility of making mistakes should not be confined to one 'type' nor confused with such knowledge's inherent incompleteness and uncertainty about the future.
3. I would affirm of any knowledge gleaned from observation of the physical cosmos, whether it be the most fundamental Principle of Non-Contradiction (concerning the identity and distinction of things we observe) or that my cat is currently seeking a bird (both truths important for the articulation of Christianity) or that under certain circumstances F=MA, fall under the following criteria:
(i) When reached by unaided reason they may possibly be wrong – human reason on its own is fallible. This is surely the main basis which we agree that the infallible Magisterium can usefully apply to such natural knowledge.
(ii) They can be justifiably certain. Unaided reason can get at the truth about nature.
(iii) They will differ in the degree of their universal applicability, across the hierarchical structure of the unified cosmos. This varying range does not make them radically different types of knowledge.
(iv) They are all open to deeper contextualization. Whilst we are within the space-time cosmos we can never observe it all, and must always have a certain openness to learning, refining etc. none of our knowledge about the cosmos is really complete
(v) They all carry a degree of inherent uncertainty with regard to their wider contextualization, e.g., exactly how patterns of the past will intelligibly connect and integrate with the future. Any prediction of any type always comes with the rider 'other thing being equal'. Of course FAITH movement must be open about this uncertainty which is an aspect of all knowledge about the cosmos. But it is only an aspect of a growing body of certain knowledge.
Human living and knowing is always an encounter with that which we only partially possess and control, and must intelligently and lovingly contribute to. Experimental method is just one, refined, tool in this exploration.
5. For a truth to be “forever valid” it must be of the most universal applicability within creation and to the new creation after the last day. “Things exists” would surely be a candidate, “things cease to exist” is harder to envisage (whilst it is certainly an important truth). Both these truths and also the Principle of non-Contradiction are given a deeper and more beautiful contextualization through the success of scientific method. This and whatever else is justifiably certain in our knowing will cohere with revelation. Indeed it is natural revelation. The Catholic tradition has never been wary of using such gifts for the glory of God and the salvation of souls.
“I would affirm of any knowledge gleaned from observation of the physical cosmos, whether it be the most fundamental Principle of Non-Contradiction (concerning the identity and distinction of things we observe) or that my cat is currently seeking a bird (both truths important for the articulation of Christianity) or that under certain circumstances F=MA, fall under the following criteria: (i) When reached by unaided reason they may possibly be wrong…” – Fr Hugh
"There are some who, as we said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and say that people can judge this to be the case. And among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.-Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one. We can, however, demonstrate negatively even that this view is impossible, if our opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so. For such a man, as such, is from the start no better than a vegetable.” – Aristotle
"although these theories [concerning astronomy] save the appearances, one cannot conclude from this that they are true, because, perhaps according to some other approach not yet understood by men, the stellar phenomena will be (better) accounted for." – St Thomas Aquinas
Re: Theodoisus's quotations:
Aristotle: That's why I called the Principle of non-contradiction the most "fundamental" knowledge. I agree of course that it is fundamental to all meaning, inherent to every observation. But Hegel, for instance, to my undertanding, did not. Which goes to show my point that natural reflection's lack of infallibilty cannot be said to apply especailly to experimental science and to be inherent to it method. Actually that's surely why, as Theodosius and I agree I think, that the Magisterium has a relevance here. The demonstration of the most fundamental, 'self-evident' truths are sort of negative, but clearly needed, and, as I made clear in my following point (ii), clearly possible with justifiable certainty.
Aquinas: Where the evidence or lack of it does not justify certainty we certainly shouldn't affirm 'truth'. Where we have good observational evidence for patterns which have occured and recognize that they will be intelligibly built upon in the future, and under certain cicumstances be repeatable, we can, talk of truth. This, for us, is the 'formality' of things.
I would think that Aquinas would place the modern recognition that Force is proportional to acceleration in certain common situations in a different category to the astronomical theories of the thirteenth century. The respective evidences are of a different order.
St Thomas does not agree with you.
"No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration."
Hegel was not just wrong, he was lying.
The certainty of the first principle of demonstration can be transmitted to other propositions by valid demonstration. The articles of faith are quasi self-evident. This forms the basis for St Thomas's understanding of science.
"We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God."
On this definition the empirical sciences are not sciences in the strict sense. As your qualification “in certain common situations” implicitly concedes, they are intrinsically provisional.
"although these theories save the appearances, one cannot conclude from this that they are true, because, perhaps according to some other approach not yet understood by men, the stellar phenomena will be (better) accounted for."
Consequently they are unfit for synthesis with sacred theology.
Surely it is only mildly ironic that Theodosius (aka Aelianus) is selling a peculiarly 20th century from of Popperian rationalism in the philosophy, while ignoring the very strong claims made by Aquinas about the plave of absolute necessity in nature.
Aristotle’s dialectical proof of the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) appears to presuppose bivalence (or, at least, Excluded Middle) and identity (and negation?); presumably, the opposition will want to know (i) whether LNC remains basic if even an indirect proof of it rests on these other claims, and (ii) whether Aristotle can reconcile his denial of bivalence in De Interpretatione IX with his reliance on it here. Finally, the opposition – well, OK: Hegel, Heraclitus, Protagoras, Graham Priest; have I missed anyone? – can quite rightly reply that the mere assertion that they’re lying when they say they don’t believe LNC is a particularly crude way of begging the question.
Aquinas argues that there is absolute necessity in nature (here, but see the whole article). In particular ‘...What belongs to a thing by reason of its essential principles, must obtain by absolute necessity in all things’. Theodosius has argued that since non-deductive knowledge of the natural world doesn’t give us necessary truths, it doesn’t gives us certainty. If Thomist philosophy of science is sound, then, if we know the essential principles at least some material things, then we have knowledge of necessary truths. Presumably, we have knowledge of the essential principles of some contingently existing material things. Theodosius’ denial of Thomist philosophy of (natural) science is réchauffé Popper; this is only mildly ironic.
The two types of natural knowledge affirmed by Theodosius could then I think be described as (i) those propositions “validly” (infallibly?) derived from the Principle of Non-Contradiction, and other ‘self-evident’ truths (N.B. presumably, in these terms, it is mentally easier to admit the opposite of those conclusions?), and (ii) those patterns and laws about the physical universe which apply only “in certain common situations”, which latter he concludes are “intrinsically provisional”.
The former, of universal application, can be synthesized with theology, the latter, in this vision, cannot.
1. First I can’t accept the Thomistic quotation as saving “articles of Faith” from being prevented by the above approach. “(P)rinciples revealed by God” are indeed foundational to the science of theology but so are their application to and synthesis with naturally revealed, non-universally applicable truths, not least, the key specific historical events of our faith, which after much knocking about and discussion, did so become. More broadly speaking the very use of human language in Church teaching implies such a dependence upon specific experiences within time and space.
2. I can agree that knowledge of those dimensions of the universe which are of more universal application are more ready for such synthesis, what I can’t accept is the radical epistemological divide. All intelligible knowledge flows from human observation of the world around.
Our deeper insights into less universal features, can and do refine, deepen and beautify our knowledge of the more universal patterns of the universe. Our world is full of such lower-level dimensions and happennings, ripe for use in illustrating, deepening and living our faith: e.g. the very formality of my cat across certain time and space.
3. For me “in certain common situations” means of lesser universality, not thereby, as I hope is clear, “intrinsically provisional”.
It is not possible to mentally admit the contrary of any self-evident principles. The first principle of demonstration is first because it is not possible to reason at all without it. It is true that propositions deduced from these principles are less certain because of the possibility of a false inference. However, the Church is competent to judge the validity of such inferences allowing the synthesis of such reasoning with that derived exclusively from revealed premises. In regard to empirical reasoning the Magisterium only has competence to declare negatively if a thesis of the natural sciences is incompatible with revealed truth not if such a thesis is true. The Church has no competence to say that the sun revolves around the earth but it also has no competence to declare that earth revolves around the sun. It is not a truth revealed by God that the earth revolves around the sun nor is it certainly deducible from self- evident principles of reason. This is why even a basic claim of the natural sciences like this cannot be synthesised with the articles of faith. The key specific historical events of our faith are revealed by God. I have no idea what you mean by them being knocked around and discussed and only then revealed by God. It is true that orthodox fundamental theology requires the existence of naturally certainly knowable truths in order to articulate the consequences of the Church’s teachings concerning God and man and the union of Divine and Human natures in Christ but these truths can be obtained from reflection on what you refer to as the absolutely universal features of created being. The epistemological divide in question is not absolute per se but only quoad nos. Our difficulty is twofold: Though we do have certain knowledge of the existence of the entities of which we have direct experience we do not possess and cannot obtain by our natural faculties comprehensive knowledge of the essences of any creature however low on the hierarchy of being. So while there are necessary truths concerning them flowing from their fundamental essences we cannot be certain of these truths beyond a very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are. Our second difficulty arises from what Paul VI and Gilson call ‘The Metaphysics of Exodus’. Contrary to Aristotle’s belief the universe does not proceed necessarily from the nature of God. God chose to give being to one of an infinitude of possible worlds and we have no way of deducing from first principles what the order of that world might be or which entities it contains. The only path open to us beyond the examination of the absolutely universal features of created being is to explore and experiment, to speculate and then to test our speculations against further exploration and experiment. Thus the experimental sciences are an authentic fruit of the Christian doctrine of Creation. Their efficacy bears witness to the fact that the Universe is the contingent creation of a single mind infinite in all perfections. If it were possible by natural reason to have certain and comprehensive knowledge of created substances or to deduce with certainty the order of the cosmos, the universe would bear witness not to the Christian doctrine of creation but to paganism and pantheism. The epistemological chasm between the empirical and the philosophically certain is absolute quoad nos and will disappear only in the light of the beatific vision. Then it will be possible to synthesis our experimental knowledge of the cosmos and the truths of the faith, but by then there will be no need to do so.
It is not possible to mentally admit the contrary of any self-evident principles.
(1) The any makes this claim absurdly false. Self-evidence is a relative notion: principles that would be self-evident to x needn’t be to y. Presumably, y can mentally admit the contrary of what is self-evident to x.
(2) Aristotle appears to deny bivalence in De Interpretatione IX. His definition of truth is, very roughly, that: (i) x is F is true iff x is F and (ii) x is not F is true iff x is not F. The conjunction of his definition of truth and the denial of bivalence entails the falsehood of LNC. Presumably, he 'mentally admitted' the denial of Bivalence, LNC and his definition of truth.
The first principle of demonstration is first because it is not possible to reason at all without it.
There appear to be several principles without which deductive reasoning is impossible; identity, for starters. That a principle P is necessary for deductive reasoning doesn’t establish that P is the first principle of demonstration.
You’re conflating reasoning and deduction. There’s quite good evidence (e.g. here, and Chapter IX of this) that everyday reasoning has very little to deduction; certainly it doesn’t always obey the rules of deduction. People can be good reasoners without being good deductive logicians. To show that LNC is central to deduction is not to show that it is central to reasoning.
Though we do have certain knowledge of the existence of the entities of which we have direct experience we do not possess and cannot obtain by our natural faculties comprehensive knowledge of the essences of any creature however low on the hierarchy of being. So while there are necessary truths concerning them flowing from their fundamental essences we cannot be certain of these truths beyond a very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are.
You’re assuming that comprehensive knowledge of essences is necessary for knowledge of necessary truths concerning material things (since you think that knowledge requires certainty). Aquinas mentions no such requirement, and one would like to see some support for it. If lack of comprehensive knowledge of the essence of a thing entails that we lack certainty about the thing (and hence lack knowledge on your official analysis of knowledge), then Revelation doesn’t give us knowledge precisely because we lack comprehensive knowledge of God.
Further, this is tiresome goalpost-shifting. In the past, you argued that scientific knowledge was intrinsically provisional. The term was never assigned any terribly clear sense, but it appeared in arguments to the effect that since there was no necessity in nature, there was no certainty in our knowledge of nature. (Since, by your lights, knowledge requires certainty, your premisses entail that we have no knowledge of nature at all; one wonders how this is distinct from skepticism). Now that necessity in nature has apparently been secured, you've resorted to the claim about comprehensive knowledge. Epicycles.
You assume you know what I think about a great many things. Indeed, you assume a great deal about me. I have not said many of the things you think I have said and you have forgotten (or not understood) many things I have said. Of course I took it as obvious that I meant it is impossible mentally to admit the opposite of a self-evident proposition that one understands. I suppose if you don’t understand it you can’t deny it either because you don’t know what the words mean. You think that I am ‘assuming that comprehensive knowledge of essences is necessary for knowledge of necessary truths concerning material things’ I am not. I specifically said that knowledge of the existence of things did not require comprehensive knowledge of the essence of the thing nor did a very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are. But I fear I am being inconsistent on one point. I am conversing with a Nihilist who denies the first principle of demonstration. So I suppose I had better stop. Romans 14:1 and all that.
Cirdan,
about no knowledge of God through revelation - isn't that rather the point? :-)(of revelation, I mean) - stuff you could never know with certainty (and some stuff you could but might never get round to) by the light of reason, given to us and "known" by the light of faith, i.e. believed. The certainty is not less. Still, it is faith, not knowing/seeing.
Of course I took it as obvious that I meant it is impossible mentally to admit the opposite of a self-evident proposition that one understands.
Let’s try this again, then. In De Interpretatione IX, Aristotle appears to reject bivalence. In Metaphysics IV:7, Aristotle defines truth and falsity as follows: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true." The conjunction of that definition of truth and his denial of bivalence entails the falsehood of (at least one form of) LNC. Proof:
(1) ‘P’ is true if and only if P. (TRUE)
(2) ‘P’ is false if and only if not-P. (FALSE)
(3) Either ‘P’ is true or ‘P’ is false (BIVALENCE)
(4) Not: either ‘P’ is true or ‘P’ is false (Not-BIVALENCE)
(5) Not: either P or not-P (Substituting (1) and (2) in (4))
(6) Not-P and not-not-P (De Morgans’ Theorem on (5))
(6) directly contradicts LNC. Presumably, the founder of formal logic ‘mentally admitted’ (whatever that means; I proceed on the assumption that it’s something akin to assent) his definition of truth, his denial of bivalence, and LNC. You’re wont to appeal to the bit of rhetoric about vegetables in Metaphysics IV:4; I take it you agree that Aristotle thinks LNC is self-evident. The conjunction of Aristotle’s definition of truth (and falsity) and his denial of bivalence trivially entails the ‘opposite’ of LNC. Aristotle was the first sytematiser of logic; we may assume that he saw and ‘mentally admitted’ the immediate consequences of his basic principles; after all, he was the first to sytematise them and their consequences. Aristotle appears knowingly to have asserted the 'opposite' of LNC. This seems to constitute a decisive counterexample to your claim above.
Also. There's a certain pointlessness to the transcendental-style argument for LNC that you're busy purveying. For, even if it turned out that it was impossible to admit the opposite of a 'self-evident' proposition, it wouldn't follow that the 'self-evident' proposition was true; at least, it wouldn't follow given a realist account of truth. So, one wonders why you've bothered.
Here's the argument:
Though we do have certain knowledge of the existence of the entities of which we have direct experience we do not possess and cannot obtain by our natural faculties comprehensive knowledge of the essences of any creature however low on the hierarchy of being. So while there are necessary truths concerning them flowing from their fundamental essences we cannot be certain of these truths beyond a very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are.
Regimenting:
1. There are necessary truths about material things which flow from their fundamental essences.
2. We do not possess and cannot obtain, by our natural faculties, comprehensive knowledge of the essences of any creature, however low on the hierarchy of being,
3. Since (2) obtains, we cannot be certain of the truths in (1) (beyond a very general understanding of subsistent intelligence…etc.)
(1) We know, Aelianus believes that knowledge entails certainty. Contraposing, if not certainty, then not-knowledge. Let’s assume you aren’t Aelianus. Perhaps you haven’t succumbed to the heresy that certainty is a necessary condition on knowledge. If you don’t think that certainty is a necessary condition on knowledge, then, on your premisses our knowledge of necessary truths about material things isn’t limited to categorial or singular existential claims. Of course, that isn’t what you’re arguing. You appear to be pushing the claim that the only the necessary truths about material things that we are certain of (via our natural faculties) are categorial and singular-existential truths. Since this is consistent with our possessing knowledge of substantial natural truths, and by our natural faculties no less, it is an interesting but irrelevant form of skepticism. Grice counsels charity; I’m constrained to assume you mean to make a relevant remark, and therefore that you intend to argue that the only necessary truths about material things we know, via our natural faculties, are categorial and singular-existential ones. Like Aelianus, you’re lumbered with the premiss that certainty is necessary for knowledge. This – combined with your complete inability to paragraph your posts, and your fine selection of fallacious arguments for LNC – is rather good inductive evidence that you’re Aelianus.
(2) To get from premiss (2) to (3), you’ll need a general premiss of the form: If we don’t have comprehensive knowledge of the essence of a creature then we cannot be certain of the necessary truths that flow from the fundamental essence of the creature. Call that the comprehensive requirement premiss (CRP; although, actually, euphony demands CRAP, and euphony will get what it wants). What is CRAP doing in this argument?
(3) In the past you’ve argued that since there’s no necessity in nature, our knowledge of nature lacks necessity. Since our knowledge of nature lacks necessity, it is not certain. Therefore, our knowledge of nature is uncertain. (Given your analysis of knowledge, it follows that we have no knowledge of nature at all; since that just is a surprisingly old-fashioned form of skepticism, you’ve only infrequently been willing to push your argument to that conclusion). The argument is (surprise!) patently invalid, but let that pass. Aquinas adduces decent grounds for thinking that there is absolute necessity in nature. If so, your argument is refuted by a source you consider authoritative. The introduction of CRAP is a transparent attempt to block that refutation; it has no independent motivation, at least, none that you’ve seen fit to share. CRAP is a piece of transparent ad hocery.
Onward.
You say:
You think that I am assuming that comprehensive knowledge of essences is necessary for knowledge of necessary truths concerning material things I am not. I specifically said that knowledge of the existence of things did not require comprehensive knowledge of the essence of the thing nor did a very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are.
(4) In general, that a thing exists (in nature) is not a necessary truth about it; that my dog exists is a contingent fact. So, even if you concede – grudgingly, it has to be said – that one can know that N exists without comprehensive knowledge of N’s essence, it doesn’t follow that comprehensive knowledge isn’t necessary for knowledge of necessary truths flowing from the essence of N.
(5) ‘…A very general understanding of what subsistent intelligences, rational animals, irrational animals, vegetables and inanimate substances are’ is only doubtfully natural science: since it is knowledge of kinds of kinds ; an exercise in the theory of categories, and therefore metaphysics, rather than natural science (Call this claim (THEODOSIUS – GENERA). But suppose that this sort of categorial thinking were part of natural science and that we had the right kind of modal knowledge about it and that truths such as N exists are necessary (Call this claim THEODOSIUS – EXISTENCE). Then substantive truths about individuals in nature follow by trivial deduction:
1. Necessarily: Everything which belongs to the genus G has the property P. (THEODOSIUS – GENERA )
2.Necessarily: N exists. (THEODOSIUS - EXISTENCE)
3. N belongs to G. (Natural existents exist by belonging to a particular genus: there are no naturally existing things which are not also members of some genus or other. For at least some things in nature, we know which genus they belong to and the attendant necessary properties: man; rational natures; rationality)
4. Necessarily: N belongs to G. (2, 3, and the thought that things can’t change genera)
5. Necessarily, N is P. (1, 4, and the Kripke Schema)
Presumably, deduction gives certainty, and therefore knowledge. Anyone who can do the proof can certainly(!) arrive at a necessary truth about natural things which is neither a generic truth nor a singular-existential one. Your claim is apparently self-refuting.
(6)
(a) In any case, THEODOSIUS – GENERA is inconsistent with basic Aristotelico-Thomistic metaphysics. Aristotle says that genera have no essences, and that we have knowledge of essences (Metaphysics VII: 4); Aquinas argues that we know necessary truths about natural kinds, and about individuals, not just necessary truths about genera; indeed, almost all the examples he gives in SCG II, XXX are of species-level necessary properties: ‘there is absolute necessity in things from the order of their essential principles to the properties flowing from their matter or form; a saw, because it is made of iron, must be hard; and a man is necessarily capable of learning’ (SCG II, XXX: 11).
(b) Elsewhere (SCG II, XXX: 14, 15), Aquinas suggests that at least some efficient causes in nature act with absolute necessity. Presumably, comprehensive knowledge of N requires knowledge of all four of N’s causes. But if N has been produced by a necessary, efficient, natural cause, one can know a necessary truth about, without comprehensive knowledge of, N. This, of course, is distinct from knowledge of N's genus, and knowledge that N exists.
(c) In fact, if your claim about genera were true, we would be unable to form definitions of natural things; since definitions, on the classical account anyway, designate a species by picking out a genus and then a mark which distinguishes the species from every other member of the genus. Since, according to you, we know only generic properties, we can’t form definitions. Well, maybe by Revelation.
Theodosius says: "In regard to empirical reasoning the Magisterium only has competence to declare negatively if a thesis of the natural sciences is incompatible with revealed truth not if such a thesis is true. …. I have no idea what you mean by them being knocked around and discussed and only then revealed by God.
Self-evident principles of reason are not given to us a priori. They are simply to do with the inherent dynamic of being an observer of reality. Truths which are less universal, such as historical events/aspects of universe such as the ascension of our Lord, or the fact that the there has been an orbiting relationship of the earth to the sun for many years, or that I am now typing on my computer, or aspects of the Natural Law (clearly not deducible from the Principle of non-contradiction (PNC) but clearly the object of church teaching) also come from human observation of reality and can also be justifiably certain. And these latter fill out the content of the PNC, which is not simply a bald, abstract truth. For instance we know that to be a thing does not just involve the principles of identity and distinction but also structure and meaningful environmental relationship.
Prediction about the future is a special case whether within experimental science or about the sun rising tomorrow or about my seat continuing to hold me up. Prediction never has absolute certainty. But prediction (through scientific thesis about the future or not) does not exhaust science, but in its success, tells us something about the way in which the world works.
Why should the most universal of natural truths (which include ‘self-evident’ truths in that one cannot observe without them) have a monopoly on justifiable certainty? Again I say this dualistic epistemology is closer to the ingrained culture of Cartesian doubt than the tradition of Catholic realisim.
The apostles were not sure of the physical Resurrection of Christ initially, the status of the Creation story has been legitimately discussed by the Church before Church pronouncements, events of Jesus’s life in apocryphal Gospels were considered as possible revelation by theologians etc. The Early Church was not simply unanimous from the word ‘go’ concerning all the details of the historical events at the heart of Salvation history. These objects of observation we just that before they became formal dogma.
1. The natural law is deduced from the self-evident first principle of practical reason "the good is to be pursued and evil avoided" and from our knowledge of human nature arrived at through direct experience.
2. The Church clearly has the authority to define non-revealed truths of the philosophical order such as that the intellective soul is the form of the human body. Do you think the Church has the authority to define non-revealed principles of the natural law (I do)?
3. Do you think that the Church has the authority to define non-revealed propositions of empirical science (such as that the earth revolves around the sun)? If not (as I suppose) it would seem that the epistemological distinction I assert and you deny is assumed by the Magisterium.
4. The conclusions of historians are fallible and not certain. The events of public revelation are certain because they are revealed not because of the labours of historians (though they can be vindicated as historical claims with the corresponding level of certainty). The fact that the Church takes a certain time to define the contents of revelation does not affect whether something belongs to the deposit or not. The Magisterium cannot add to the deposit or take away from it.
5. Self-evident principles of reason are known in and through the natural light. They would not be known if man had no experience but they are not inferred from experience.
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